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Abstract
This article uses a sample of 3076 employees working in the USA to examine the relationship between the frequency of 
unethical behavior that employees observe in their organization and their intention to whistleblow. The results confirm the 
expected curvilinear relationship based on the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct. This relationship is a combination of 
a diminishing negative relationship between the frequency of observed unethical behavior and the intention to whistleblow 
internally and a linear positive relationship between the frequency of observed unethical behavior and the intention to whistle-
blow externally. The beliefs of employees about how supportive their management is when handling whistleblowing reports 
moderates the relationship between the frequency of unethical behavior employees observe and their intention to whistleblow.
Keywords Whistleblowing · Voice · Speak-up · Unethical behavior · Focus theory of normative conduct
Introduction
There is a rich literature on whistleblowing in work set-
tings. Because whistleblowing is an important phenomenon 
(Miceli et al. 1991, 2009) and a complex one (Culiberg and 
Mihelič 2017; Nayir and Herzig 2012), there have been 
many studies on the characteristics of whistleblowers, the 
process of whistleblowing, and the consequences of whistle-
blowing (Culiberg and Mihelič 2017; Near and Miceli 
2016). An individual’s morality and commitment, the inten-
sity and type of unethical behavior, and the organizational 
culture and reporting infrastructure (Dungan et al. 2019; 
Vadera et al. 2009) are some of the individual, situational, 
and organizational antecedents that explain who, when, how, 
and to whom employees report unethical behavior.
This article focuses on the frequency of observed unethi-
cal behavior as an antecedent of whistleblowing. Although 
this situational antecedent has not been identified and stud-
ied in the literature, we predict that it influences whether 
and how employees will blow the whistle. More specifically, 
this article asserts that the more often employees observe 
unethical behavior in their organization, the weaker is their 
intention to whistleblow internally and the stronger their 
intention to whistleblow externally. The Focus Theory of 
Normative Conduct developed by Cialdini and colleagues 
(Cialdini et al. 1990, 1991) will be used to explain these rela-
tionships and the moderating effect of the employees’ beliefs 
about how supportive their management is in handling their 
whistleblowing reports.
To test the above-mentioned relationships, we used a 
sample of 3076 employees working in the USA. Before pre-
senting and discussing the results, we first define the con-
cepts, develop the hypotheses, and explain the method used.
Whistleblowing and Unethical Behavior
A widely used definition of whistleblowing is “the disclo-
sure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, 
immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their 
employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to 
effect action” (Near and Miceli 1985, p. 4). Whistleblow-
ing refers to employees reporting unethical behavior they 
have observed to someone who could stop and correct this 
behavior, sanction the perpetrator(s), and/or prevent this type 
of behavior from happening again. Unethical behavior is the 
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umbrella term for illegal, immoral, or illegitimate behavior 
(Jones 1991). This definition means that whistleblowing can 
be done internally or externally (although there are scholars, 
like Jubb (1999), who argue that the definition of whistle-
blowing should be restricted to external reporting). In the 
case of internal whistleblowing, allegations are brought to 
the attention of the perpetrator(s), (higher) management, and 
an organizational ethics hotline (Kaptein 2011). In the case 
of external whistleblowing, allegations are brought to the 
attention of a party outside of the organization, for example, 
a regulator or the press (Near et al. 2004). This definition 
of whistleblowing leaves open how employees blow the 
whistle, for instance, verbally (in person or by phone) or in 
writing (letter or email), and anonymously, confidentially, 
or publicly (Kaptein 2011).
The concept of whistleblowing is different from the con-
cept of voice on which there is a growing literature (Liang 
et al. 2012; McLean et al. 2013). Unlike whistleblowing, 
voice is not limited to unethical behavior and is broader 
because it is about “employees recommending [sic] changes 
in the organization with the intent to improve operations 
or otherwise benefit the organization.” (Near and Miceli 
2016, p. 109). This is similar to what Huang and Paterson 
(2017) call “ethical voice”, which concerns not only unethi-
cal behavior but also raising ideas to improve the ethics of 
policies, products, and procedures. Whistleblowing is also 
more specific than error reporting (Zhao and Olivera 2006), 
speaking-up (Edmondson 2003), and upward communica-
tion (Detert and Edmondson 2011). Whistleblowing is how-
ever broader than Treviño and Victor’s (1992) concept of 
peer reporting. Whistleblowing can also include reporting 
about unethical behavior of people who have higher posi-
tions in the organization. Whistleblowing is also different 
from reporting of grievances; the latter involves employees 
raising personal issues, such as disputes with their employer 
(Martin 2014; Vandekerckhove and Phillips 2019).
The studies on unethical behavior as an antecedent of 
whistleblowing have mainly focused on the moral intensity 
of the unethical behavior. Jones (1991) developed the con-
struct of moral intensity, which consists of several situational 
characteristics that define ethical dilemmas, to facilitate 
understanding of ethical decision-making. These charac-
teristics have also been suggested for unethical behavior 
as an antecedent of whistleblowing decision-making: i.e., 
the magnitude of the consequences of the unethical behav-
ior (Cassematis and Wortley 2013; Robinson et al. 2012); 
the social consensus on the extent to which the behavior 
is unethical (Valentine and Godkin 2019); the probability 
of the effect of the unethical behavior (Curtis and Taylor 
2009); the temporal immediacy of the effect of the unethical 
behavior (Singer et al. 1998); the proximity of the unethi-
cal behavior (Singer et al. 1998); and the concentration of 
the effect of the unethical behavior (Alleyne et al. 2013). 
Other factors of unethical behavior found to be antecedents 
of whistleblowing decision-making are the strength of the 
evidence of unethical behavior (Brink et al. 2013; Miceli and 
Near 1985) and the type of unethical behavior. Near et al. 
(2004) found that employees who witness mismanagement, 
sexual harassment, or unspecified legal violations are more 
likely to report them than employees who observe stealing, 
waste, safety problems, or unfair discrimination. Near and 
colleagues were however unable to explain their results due 
to a lack of data.
The frequency of unethical behavior is another potential 
antecedent of whistleblowing that has not been identified 
either by research on specific antecedents of whistleblow-
ing or by published overviews of potential antecedents. 
For example, Bowes-Speary and O’Leary-Kelly (2005), 
Zhang et al. (2009), Miceli et al. (2012), and Valentine and 
Godkin (2019) mention many (potential) antecedents of 
whistleblowing but not the frequency of unethical behav-
ior (or related terms such as wrongdoing or immoral, ille-
gal, or illegitimate behavior). Neither does the proposed 
research agenda on whistleblowing by Miceli et al. (2012) 
and Culiberg and Mihelič (2017). Most research does take 
unethical behavior into account because whistleblowing is 
about how people respond to observed unethical behavior; 
however, they approach unethical behavior as a unique, iso-
lated, or specific incident that people are confronted with. 
There are at least two exceptions. One is Lee, Heilmann, 
and Near’s study (2004) that showed that the frequency 
and duration of respondents’ experience of sexual harass-
ment predicted their whistleblowing. Another exception is 
research by Miceli and Near (2002), where they found that 
whistleblowers believed that wrongdoing was more likely to 
stop when it was less frequent. In both studies, the frequency 
of observed unethical behavior did not include unethical 
behavior in general but was limited to the specific unethical 
behavior being reported. As discussed later in this article, 
the frequency of unethical behavior can be related to the 
moral intensity of unethical behavior.
This article focuses on the frequency of unethical behav-
ior in general. We expect that the frequency with which 
employees observe (as a sensory act) unethical behavior in 
general in their organization influences whether they will 
blow the whistle once they are confronted with an unethi-
cal behavior. What is observed as unethical behavior is not 
limited to what the employees themselves have experienced 
as a victim [Lee et al. (2004) have studied this], but it can 
also include unethical behavior they have witnessed as a 
bystander. Kaptein (2008a) developed a scale for measuring 
the frequency of observed unethical behavior in an organiza-
tion. Such behavior is observed by employees in their work 
and are morally unacceptable to the larger community. This 
scale was developed based on the codes of business organi-
zations. It includes a broad spectrum of 37 items ranging 
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from “Providing inappropriate information to analysts and 
investors” and “Submitting false or misleading invoices to 
customers” to “Violating environmental standards or regula-
tions” and “Stealing or misappropriating assets (e.g., money, 
equipment, materials).” We use this scale to examine the 
frequency with which employees observe unethical behavior 
in general.
This article also focuses on the intention to whistleblow. 
There has been much research on the intention, propen-
sity, preference, motivation, or inclination to whistleblow 
(Alleyne et al. 2019; Cho and Song 2015; Latan et al. 2019; 
MacNab and Worthley 2008; Mansbach and Bachner 2009; 
Nayir and Herzig 2012; Nayir et al. 2018; Valentine and 
Godkin 2019) defined as “the individual’s probability of 
actually engaging in whistle-blowing behaviour” (Chiu 
2002, p. 582). The idea behind studying the intention to 
whistleblow instead of the actual behavior is that intention 
is a prerequisite for behavior (Alleyne et al. 2013) and even 
a strong predictor of actual behavior (Ajzen 1991). It is 
widely recognized that the intention is not identical to actual 
whistleblowing behavior (Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran 
2005), that intentions to whistleblow do not always translate 
into actual whistleblowing behavior (Park and Blenkinsopp 
2009), and that studying whistleblowing behavior has cer-
tain advantages (Miceli et al. 2008). However, when study-
ing the relevance of antecedents, such as the frequency of 
observed unethical behavior, the influence of the antecedent 
on the intention must be studied first before studying the 
influence of the antecedent on behavior. This is because it is 
only when the influence of the antecedent on the intention 
has been ascertained that it becomes possible to study how 
the antecedent influences behavior via the intention. In addi-
tion, given that whistleblowing is a hypersensitive topic and 
studying actual whistleblowing behavior is quite complex 
(Bjørkelo et al. 2008) and inherently difficult to measure 
(Alleyne et al. 2019), it is therefore useful to study the rela-
tionship between the antecedents and the whistleblowing 
intention (Alleyne et al. 2019; Culiberg and Mihelič 2017). 
In this regard, we are following a well-established research 
tradition (Valentine and Godkin 2019).
Hypotheses
To understand the relationship between the frequency of 
observed unethical behavior and the intention to whistle-
blow, it is relevant to distinguish internal from external 
whistleblowing. As explained below, it is reasonable to 
expect the frequency of observed unethical behavior to have 
different relationships with either forms of whistleblowing. 
So we first develop separate hypotheses on internal and 
external whistleblowing. From these emerges a hypothesis 
on whistleblowing in general. The final hypothesis is about 
a moderating factor.
Internal Whistleblowing
It is reasonable to expect a diminishing negative relationship 
between the frequency of observed unethical behavior and 
the intention to whistleblow internally. The Focus Theory of 
Normative Conduct as developed by Cialdini and colleagues 
(Cialdini 2003; Cialdini et al. 1990, 1991) explains that this 
relationship can be reasonably expected.
According to the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct, 
there are two kinds of norms relevant for explaining human 
behavior: injunctive and descriptive norms. Injunctive norms 
prescribe what ought to be done; they are perceptions about 
what constitute typically morally approved and disapproved 
behavior. Descriptive norms describe what is normal; they 
are characterizations of behaviors that are typically per-
formed. People are influenced in their behavior both by how 
things should be (the injunctive norms) and how things are 
(the descriptive norms). Which of these two types of norms 
has the stronger influence depends on which specific norm 
is present, most demanding, and most salient for the indi-
vidual at the time of the behavior; in other words, the norm 
on which the person focuses at the time. Descriptive norms 
can influence people’s behavior more than injunctive norms 
can (Reid and Aiken 2013) because descriptive norms tend 
to motivate behavior in the immediate context and is more 
easily observable (Cialdini et al. 2006; Reno et al. 1993). 
The Focus Theory of Normative Conduct has been useful 
for studying many types of behavior, such as littering (Cial-
dini et al. 1990), alcohol consumption (Lee et al. 2007), 
theft (Cialdini et al. 2006), energy conservation (Schultz 
et al. 2007), sun protection (Reid and Aiken 2013), seat belt 
use (Litt et al. 2014), and counterproductive work behaviors 
(Jacobson et al. 2020).
There are at least two relevant injunctive norms that can 
influence the whistleblowing intentions of employees. The 
first injunctive norm refers to the unethical behavior that 
employees observe and the extent to which that behavior 
is considered unethical. According to Dozier and Miceli 
(1985) and Gundlach, Douglas, and Martinko (2003), the 
whistleblowing decision-making process comprises of at 
least four steps (which corresponds to the ethical decision-
making models proposed by Rest (1986) and Jones (1991)): 
observing the behavior, analyzing and judging whether 
the behavior is unethical or not, forming an intention to 
whistleblow, and engaging in the act of whistleblowing. 
When employees observe unethical behavior, the question 
is whether they also analyze and judge it as being unethi-
cal. Whether this happens depends on the injunctive norms. 
The injunctive norms—established for example in laws and 
regulations, codes of conduct, policies and procedures—may 
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characterize the behavior as unethical. Business codes of 
ethics are also a source of injunctive norms because they 
prescribe many different types of behavior as ethical or 
unethical. Kaptein (2008a) also relied on business codes of 
ethics to generate the items in his scale for the frequency of 
observed unethical behavior.
A second relevant injunctive norm refers to the respon-
sibility of employees when they observe unethical behav-
ior at work. Once employees have judged that the observed 
behavior is unethical, the next question is whether they 
acknowledge their responsibility to report this (blow the 
whistle); this is part of the third step in the whistleblowing 
decision-making process. Many business codes of ethics 
prescribe that employees who observe unethical behavior 
in their organization have the moral responsibility to take 
action to redress the situation (Hassink et al. 2007; Jack-
son et al. 2010). This is consistent with the literature that 
considers whistleblowing a positive social behavior (Miceli 
et al. 2008), altruistic (Dozier and Miceli 1985), as loyalty 
to society (Andrade 2015), as a moral duty (Ceva and Boc-
chiola 2020), and as the normative responsibility of employ-
ees (Tsahuridu and Vandekerckhove 2008). In many legal 
jurisdictions, employees also have the legal responsibility 
to blow the whistle given the law that passive observers can 
be held liable for not taking adequate action (Tsahuridu and 
Vandekerckhove 2008). Therefore, when employees observe 
unethical behavior, injunctive norms do not only prescribe 
that they should evaluate the behavior as unethical but that 
they should also disclose and expose it (whistleblow).
Descriptive norms can have an opposite influence from 
that of injunctive norms in the whistleblowing decision-
making process. In an ideal situation, descriptive norms 
are similar to injunctive norms in the sense that employees 
observe that colleagues blow the whistle when they evaluate 
an unethical behavior as unethical. However, when employ-
ees observe that not every colleague evaluates an unethical 
behavior as unethical and/or blows the whistle when they 
ought to, then descriptive and injunctive norms diverge. The 
more employees observe that their colleagues do not cor-
rectly evaluate unethical behavior and/or do not blow the 
whistle when they ought to, the more likely that the injunc-
tive and descriptive norms diverge. This means, the more 
likely employees will believe that the unethical behavior is 
not entirely unethical or not unethical at all and that they 
should not always or maybe never whistleblow when they 
observe what they consider as unethical behavior. Instead of 
evaluating the observed behavior as unethical, it is whistle-
blowing about it that is characterized as unethical from a 
descriptive point of view.
When we use the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct to 
predict the relationship between the frequency of observed 
unethical behavior and the intention to whistleblow inter-
nally, we expect that the more often employees observe 
unethical behavior, the less inclined they will be to engage 
in internal whistleblowing once they are confronted with 
an unethical behavior. Cialdini et al. (1990, 1991) found 
that people were more likely to litter themselves when they 
saw more litters because the descriptive pro-littering norm 
diverged from the injunctive anti-littering norm. Smith et al. 
(2012) and Robinson et al. (2014) also found that when 
injunctive and descriptive norms conflict, people’s intentions 
to follow the injunctive norms become weaker. The present 
study is not concerned with whether employees who observe 
unethical behavior are also more likely to behave unethi-
cally themselves. Robinson and O’Leary-Kelly (1998) have 
studied this topic. We are concerned with whether frequently 
observing unethical behavior leads to a change in employ-
ees’ intention to whistleblow. If employees do not observe 
unethical behavior in their work, it is more likely that the 
descriptive norm does not diverge from the injunctive norm 
because unethical behavior and the descriptive norm “do 
not whistleblow when unethical behavior is observed” are 
not salient. If the frequency of observed unethical behavior 
increases and becomes more salient, then the descriptive 
norm might become “unethical behavior is the norm.” In 
addition, the higher the frequency of observed unethical 
behavior, the more salient this descriptive norm becomes rel-
ative to the injunctive norm “ethical behavior is the norm.” 
So the higher the frequency of observed unethical behavior, 
the more likely employees will think that unethical behavior 
is normal and that whistleblowing about unethical behavior 
is abnormal (because one only blows the whistle on behav-
ior that is supposed to be not normal or not accepted). This 
would then make it less likely that employees will form the 
intention to whistleblow internally when they are confronted 
with unethical behavior.
It is reasonable to expect that the relationship between 
the frequency of observed unethical behavior and internal 
whistleblowing is diminishingly negative. The study of Cial-
dini et al. (1990) helps illustrate this point. The study found 
that the more litter there is in the surrounding (in their case, 
flyers that were thrown on the ground), the more likely peo-
ple will also litter. However, this effect was diminishing in 
that as the amount of litter increased, the less difference each 
additional piece of litter made on the likelihood that people 
littered and that given a certain amount of litter (in their case 
eight flyers lying on the ground), additional pieces of litter 
did not lead to more people who littered. In the study, eve-
ryone already having littered did not explain this last point, 
because almost 60% of the participants did not litter when 
there were eight flyers lying on the ground. We can also 
expect that the more unethical behavior employees observe, 
the less any incremental increase in observations will influ-
ence their intention to blow the whistle internally. The rea-
son for this diminishing effect is that one or a few more 
observations of unethical behavior has a larger contribution 
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to the salience of the descriptive norm “unethical behavior 
is normal and blowing the whistle is abnormal” than when 
more observations of unethical behavior are added to an 
already large number of observations of unethical behavior. 
The higher the frequency of observed unethical behavior, 
the more it confirms to the employees that the descriptive 
norm is “blowing the whistle internally is not normal” and 
the less it changes the descriptive norm. Furthermore, we 
expect that a high frequency of observed unethical behavior 
does not lead to the situation where nobody in the organiza-
tion would have any intention to blow the whistle internally. 
Even when employees observe unethical behavior very fre-
quently, the injunctive norms could still be acknowledged 
and influential, although they might be less strong than 
when they converge with the descriptive norms. Jacobson 
et al. (2020) shows that descriptive and injunctive norms 
can exert independent effects on behavior even when one of 
the two norms has a stronger influence because the weaker 
norm can nevertheless influence a behavior when it triggers 
within the person an awareness of that norm. Moreover, the 
personal norms of employees, which differ from injunctive 
and descriptive norms in that they refer to individual-level 
standards rather than the standards of social groups (Nie-
miec et al. 2020), may explain why employees are less or not 
influenced by their social context and keep to their intention 
to whistleblow internally even when they very frequently 
observe unethical behavior. Therefore, we formulate our first 
hypothesis:
H1 The relationship between the frequency of unethical 
behavior observed by employees in their organization and 
their intention to engage in internal whistleblowing is dimin-
ishingly negative.
External Whistleblowing
A different relationship holds between the frequency of 
observed unethical behavior and the intention to whistle-
blow externally.
An injunctive norm may prescribe that when employees 
observe unethical behavior, they first have to consider inter-
nal whistleblowing before they decide to do it externally. 
Current laws, business codes of ethics, and whistleblow-
ing policies prescribe that employees should first report the 
wrongdoing internally (Hassink et al. 2007; Tsahuridu and 
Vandekerckhove 2008). This prescription is also supported 
by the literature: i.e., internal whistleblowing is considered 
to stimulate more self-control (Miceli et al. 1991), self-
efficacy (Miceli et al. 2001), and self-diagnosis (Chen and 
Lai 2014) and tends to be less damaging for the organiza-
tion and colleagues (Nayir et al. 2018) compared to external 
whistleblowing. Employees who straightaway go to the press 
when they observe for the first time a small incident at work 
cannot be considered ethical from the point of view of the 
above-mentioned injunction. However, injunctive norms do 
not forbid external whistleblowing but may consider it as 
morally justified or even required under certain conditions: 
e.g., when internal whistleblowing does not lead to the right 
follow-up action in the organization, the unethical behav-
ior is serious, there is sufficient evidence about the unethi-
cal behavior, or when it is reasonably certain that external 
whistleblowing will stop the unethical behavior (De George 
1990; Velasquez 1998).
Descriptive norms can also suggest to employees that 
they should first report internally before doing it externally. 
As gathered from the literature (Callahan and Collins 1992; 
Mansbach and Bachner 2010; Miceli et al. 2008; Miceli 
and Near 2002; Rothschild and Miethe 1999; Vandeker-
ckhove and Phillips 2019), employees are more likely to 
blow the whistle internally before doing it externally. Two 
of the reasons whistleblowers give for going external are 
their lack of trust in their organization stopping the unethi-
cal behavior and their belief that only an external party can 
stop the unethical behavior (Dworkin and Baucus 1998; 
Miceli et al. 2008). Employees judge internal whistleblow-
ing more favorably than external whistleblowing (Culiberg 
and Mihelič 2017). The latter is often seen as an extension 
of the whistleblowing process in case internal whistleblow-
ing does not bring about the expected responses (Miceli and 
Near 1992; Vandekerckhove and Phillips 2019). Therefore, 
employees who decide to reveal unethical behavior are more 
likely to do it internally first.
We can assume that the more frequently employees 
observe unethical behavior, the more they will be inclined 
towards external whistleblowing. The more frequently 
employees observe unethical behavior in their organization, 
the more likely they will believe that unethical behavior 
is (considered) normal in their organization, that internal 
whistleblowing is less expected, appreciated, or appro-
bated, and thus the less inclined they will be to blow the 
whistle internally when they witness unethical behavior. 
Furthermore, the less inclined employees are to report the 
wrongdoing internally, the more external whistleblow-
ing becomes their only option. The option to externally 
whistleblow thus becomes more salient the more frequently 
employees observe unethical behavior. This makes unethi-
cal behavior a bigger problem in the organization because 
employees observe not just a single isolated incident but 
rather a pattern of different types of unethical behavior (Cal-
lahan and Dworkin 1992; Near and Miceli 1995). The more 
serious the problem of unethical behavior becomes for the 
organization, the stronger becomes the injunctive norm that 
employees should reveal the problem externally because 
the organization appears unable to solve the problem by 
itself. In this case, the salience of the conflict between the 
descriptive norm (that unethical behavior is normal within 
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the organization) and the injunctive norm (that employ-
ees should expose unethical behavior when they observe 
it) also becomes more salient. This conflict then becomes 
a reason for resorting to external whistleblowing. At this 
point, the reporting is no longer just about one or a few 
incidents of unethical behavior but concerns a pattern of 
unethical behavior supported by the descriptive norm in 
the organization that unethical behavior is normal. We can 
therefore expect that the more frequently employees observe 
unethical behavior in their organization, the more they will 
be inclined towards external whistleblowing. We can also 
expect this relationship to be linear: every increase in the 
frequency of observed unethical behavior makes it clearer to 
employees that external whistleblowing is the only or final 
option for addressing the unethical behavior and that they 
have the responsibility to engage in this option. This leads 
to the next hypothesis:
H2 The relationship between the frequency of unethical 
behavior observed by employees in their organization and 
their intention to engage in external whistleblowing is posi-
tive and linear.
Internal and External Whistleblowing
We may expect a curvilinear relationship between the fre-
quency of observed unethical behavior and the intention to 
whistleblow when we combine the expected relationships for 
the intentions to internally and externally whistleblow. The 
relationship is expected to be U-shaped because employ-
ees who have only observed a single incident of unethical 
behavior will not or less likely have the belief that internal 
whistleblowing is not appreciated or effective, and there-
fore they will be more inclined to blow the whistle inter-
nally rather than externally. However, as stated above, the 
more frequently employees observe unethical behavior, the 
less they are inclined to blow the whistle internally and the 
more they are inclined to do it externally. We then expect 
the intention to pursue internal whistleblowing to become 
weaker more quickly than the intention to whistleblow exter-
nally becomes stronger. The reason for this is that not every 
employee who is no longer inclined to internally whistle-
blow will necessarily have the intention to do it externally 
(Kaptein 2011; Vandekerckhove and Phillips 2019). For 
example, external whistleblowing is riskier and more time-
consuming for employees than internal whistleblowing 
(Dozier and Miceli 1985; Dworkin and Baucus 1998). A 
U-shaped relationship implies that the intention to blow the 
whistle is strongest among employees when their frequency 
of observed unethical behavior is relatively low (when they 
are most inclined to whistleblow internally) or high (when 
they are most inclined to whistleblow externally). Therefore, 
the third hypothesis is:
H3 The relationship between the frequency of unethical 
behavior observed by employees in their organization and 
their intention to whistleblow is curvilinear (U-shaped).
Management Support for Whistleblowing
How the frequency of observed unethical behavior influ-
ences the intention of employees to whistleblow depends 
on how employees interpret that frequency. As explained 
above, employees infer from the frequency with which they 
observe unethical behavior what the descriptive norms are. 
Their beliefs about how management will deal with their 
whistleblowing reports are expected to influence how they 
interpret that frequency. In the whistleblowing literature, 
how management handles whistleblowing is referred to as 
supervisor or (top) management support (Mesmer-Magnus 
and Viswesvaran 2005; Sims and Keenan 1998). This con-
cept is related to the broader one of perceived organizational 
support (Eisenberger et al. 1986), which is about the global 
beliefs employees develop concerning the extent to which 
the organization values their contribution and cares about 
their well-being. In our case, management support is about 
the extent to which employees believe that management val-
ues whistleblowing reports and cares about whistleblowers.
Management support or trust in management (Casse-
matis and Wortley 2013) is important for understanding 
the intention of employees to whistleblow. Management 
support concerns the expectations of employees about the 
extent to which management will take appropriate action 
(Miceli and Near 1994a, b), handle the report confiden-
tially (Miceli et al. 2008), protect the whistleblower from 
retaliation (Cho and Song 2015; Detert and Burris 2007), 
discipline the perpetrator(s) fairly and consistently (Keenan 
1990), and will ensure that the whistleblowing report is use-
ful and effective in the sense that the unethical behavior will 
be “terminated at least partly…and within a reasonable time 
frame” (Near and Miceli 1995, p. 681). Research confirms 
the importance of management support for whistleblowing. 
A meta-analytic research by Mesmer-Magnus and Viswes-
varan (2005) shows that management support positively 
influences employees’ whistleblowing intentions. Near et al. 
(2004) found among employees of a US military base that 
the most frequent reason given for not blowing the whistle 
was the belief that managers could or would not make any 
changes and that the wrongdoing would continue unabated. 
The second most frequent reason they found was the fear of 
reprisal (cf. Near and Miceli 2016). For the whistleblowers, 
the most common reprisals were poor performance apprais-
als and tighter scrutiny of their daily activities by manage-
ment. Keil et al. (2010) report that trust in managers was 
the most influential predictor of IT employees’ intention to 
whistleblow.
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We assume that if employees believe that management 
supports whistleblowing, then the frequency of unethical 
behavior will have no impact on their intention to blow 
the whistle internally. High management support prevents 
employees from interpreting an increase in the frequency 
of observed unethical behavior as an absence of apprecia-
tion for whistleblowing. However, when management sup-
port is low, high frequency of observed unethical behavior 
makes this lack of support salient, thereby strengthening 
the descriptive norm that whistleblowing is not appreciated 
and increasingly weakening the intention of employees to 
whistleblow internally. Miceli et al. (2001) refer to this as 
the signaling effect that observations of unethical behavior 
has regarding the organization’s response to unethical behav-
ior and the chances of successful whistleblowing in that 
context. When management support is high, high frequency 
of observed unethical behavior makes this support salient, 
thereby strengthening the descriptive norm that whistleblow-
ing is appreciated and reinforcing the intention of employees 
to whistleblow internally. Employees may then, for example, 
interpret the high frequency of unethical behavior as their 
organization struggling to prevent unethical behavior suf-
ficiently, and they may feel stimulated, due to high manage-
ment support, to disclose any observed unethical behavior 
to help their organization and management in this effort. 
Therefore, we expect management support for whistleblow-
ers to moderate the relationship between the frequency of 
observed unethical behavior and the intention of employees 
to engage in internal whistleblowing.
Regarding external whistleblowing, we can expect man-
agement support to also moderate the relationship with 
the frequency of observed unethical behavior. The above-
formulated Hypothesis 2 holds that when the frequency of 
observed unethical behavior increases, employees will be 
more inclined towards external whistleblowing. Manage-
ment support is supposed to moderate this relationship in 
the sense that when employees believe management support 
for whistleblowing is low, an increase in observed unethi-
cal behavior will influence their inclination to whistleblow 
externally less than when they believe management support 
is high. The Focus Theory of Normative Conduct again 
provides an explanation for this moderation effect. When 
there is low management support, an increase in the fre-
quency of observed unethical behavior makes more sali-
ent the descriptive norm “unethical behavior is normal and 
blowing the whistle is abnormal.” The higher the frequency 
of unethical behavior when management support is low, 
the more it is emphasized to employees that management 
accepts or even appreciates unethical behavior. High man-
agement support implies that management would take action 
to combat unethical behavior because the more unethical 
behavior takes place, the more it becomes a serious, urgent, 
and undeniable problem. The belief of employees that their 
management accepts unethical behavior encourages their 
belief that whistleblowing is less appreciated or even not 
accepted in their organization. The more salient this descrip-
tive norm is, the more it discourages the intention of employ-
ees to externally whistleblow. When management does not 
combat unethical behavior internally, employees may not 
consider themselves in the position—because they are hier-
archically lower than management—to combat unethical 
behavior through external whistleblowing. Employees may 
also believe that they run more personal risks when manage-
ment support is low than when it is high. When management 
support is low, there will presumably be stronger disapproval 
for external than for internal whistleblowing because the 
former involves informing a party outside the organization 
not only about the unethical behavior but also about the low 
management support within the organization. In this case, 
management may consider external whistleblowing as dis-
loyalty to management (cf. Nayir et al. 2018) and therefore is 
more likely to take measures against employees who whistle-
blow externally (Dozier and Miceli 1985). While low man-
agement support restrains the inclination of employees to 
blow the whistle externally, we still expect that an increase 
in the frequency of observed unethical behavior will lead 
to a stronger inclination to externally whistleblow because, 
as argued above, the more unethical behavior employees 
observe, the stronger becomes the injunctive norm that they 
should report externally.
For whistleblowing in general, management support for 
whistleblowing is expected to moderate the relationship with 
the frequency of observed unethical behavior. Combining 
the above-described expected moderating role of manage-
ment support in the relationships of frequency of observed 
unethical behavior with both internal and external whistle-
blowing, we can then infer that management support should 
also have a moderating role in the relationship between the 
frequency of observed unethical behavior and whistleblow-
ing in general. This leads to our final hypotheses:
H4a The relationship between the frequency of unethical 
behavior observed by employees in their organization and 
their intention to internally whistleblow is moderated by 
the employees’ beliefs about their management’s support 
for whistleblowing, such that this relationship is weaker if 
employees perceive high management support for whistle-
blowing and stronger if employees perceive low manage-
ment support for whistleblowing.
H4b The relationship between the frequency of unethi-
cal behavior observed by employees in their organization 
and their intention to externally whistleblow is moder-
ated by the employees’ beliefs about their management’s 
support for whistleblowing, such that this relationship is 
stronger if employees perceive high management support 
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for whistleblowing and weaker if employees perceive low 
management support for whistleblowing.
H4c The relationship between the frequency of unethical 
behavior observed by employees in their organization and 
their intention to whistleblow is moderated by the employ-
ees’ beliefs about their management’s support for whistle-
blowing, such that this relationship is stronger if employees 
perceive high management support for whistleblowing and 
weaker if employees perceive low management support for 
whistleblowing.
Method
Sample
To test our six hypotheses, we needed a large and diverse 
sample of participants. Some types of intended responses, 
such as external whistleblowing, may be rare, and so the 
larger the sample, the higher the likelihood of finding such 
responses (cf. Cassematis and Wortley 2013). A variety of 
respondents working in different settings were needed to 
get a higher variance in the number of observed unethical 
behavior (cf. Culiberg and Mihelič 2017). If the study were 
conducted in an organization where respondents have the 
same frequencies of observed unethical behavior, then we 
would not find any relationships because the independent 
variable would be constant. A diverse group of respond-
ents also helps in finding widely applicable results. With 
this in mind, we collected data from the working population 
of the USA. With the assistance of the panel-database firm 
EMI-Online Research Solutions and KPMG, we compiled 
a sample of adults working full-time for organizations that 
employ at least 200 people in 16 selected industries spread 
throughout the USA. The privately registered, pre-screened 
members of the panel received a nominal financial reward 
for their participation. We excluded respondents who did not 
answer all questions or who gave very unrealistic answers. 
An example of unrealistic answer is giving all 37 items of 
the unethical behavior scale (the independent variable) the 
same answers (excluding the never and always options). The 
data collection yielded 3075 usable surveys, with a wide 
variety of demographics.1
Measures
Intention to Whistleblow
For the dependent variable, intention to whistleblow, we 
used the same scale used by Kaptein (2011). This scale 
consisted of one item for external whistleblowing and three 
items for internal whistleblowing. Respondents were asked 
what they would do if they observed unethical behavior: “If 
I observed a violation of my organization’s standards of con-
duct, I would….” This was followed by the three items that 
measured internal whistleblowing (“Try resolving the matter 
directly,” “Notify my supervisor or another manager,” and 
“Call the ethics or compliance hotline”), and by the one item 
that measured external whistleblowing (“Notify someone 
outside the organization”). For each response item, we used 
a 6-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree, with 6 = not applicable as the alterna-
tive response and treated as a missing value in the analysis. 
We computed the variable “intention to internally whistle-
blow” by averaging the answers of every respondent on their 
three responses about internal whistleblowing. The variable 
“intention to whistleblow” was computed by averaging each 
respondent’s score on “intention to internally whistleblow” 
and their answer to the single item on external whistleblow-
ing. Requesting respondents to indicate what they think they 
would do if they observe unethical behavior in their organi-
zation is similar to what has been done in studies other than 
Kaptein’s, such as those of Victor, et al. (1993), King (2001), 
Tavakoli et al. (2003), Ayers and Kaplan (2005), and Cho 
and Song (2015). The advantage of asking this is that every 
respondent can answer this question, including those who 
have not observed any unethical behavior. Furthermore, we 
1 Of the 3,075 respondents, 51.8% were female. The age dis-
tribution was: 3.1% were 18–24  years old, 9.2% 25–29  years, 
14.2% 30–34  years, 13.4% 35–39  years, 12% 35–39  years, 13.2% 
45–49 years, 14.5% 50–54 years, and 20.5% were 55 years or older. 
With regard to job tenure, 5.8% have been working for less than a 
year in their current organization, 10.6% from 1 to 2  years, 22.4% 
from 3 to 5 years, 22.4% from 6 to 10 years, and 40.1% for more than 
10 years.. A little less than a quarter (23.4%) worked for an organi-
zation with 200–1,000 employees, 15.8% for companies with 1,000–
2,999 employees, 10.9% with 3,000–4,999 employees, 14.4% with 
5000–9999 employees, and 35.4% for organizations with 10,000 or 
more employees. With regard hierarchical level within the organiza-
tion, 54.1% did not hold managerial position, 13.0% worked as super-
visor, 20.9% as mid-level manager, 7.1% as senior manager or junior 
executive, and 4.8% as senior executive, officer, or director. A wide 
range of functions were included: 9.1% sales and marketing; 11.6% 
operations and service; 6.9% manufacturing and production; 10.3% 
research, development, and engineering; 1.9% purchasing and pro-
curement; 12.2% technology; 2.2% training and education; 3.2% qual-
ity, safety and environmental; 8.7% clerical and support; 8.9% general 
management and administration; 7.2% finance and accounting, 1.3% 
legal and compliance; 1.0% internal audit and risk management; 0.8% 
public and media relations; 2.8% government and regulatory affairs; 
and 12.0% other functions. The respondents also represented a wide 
range of sectors: 5.1% aerospace and defense; 9.8% automotive; 
10.0% banking and finance; 10.0% consumer markets; 4.8% chemi-
cals and diversified industrials; 9.6% electronics, software, and ser-
vices; 1.7% forestry, mining, and natural resources; 10% government 
and public sector; 9.5% healthcare; 10.1% insurance; 3.2% media and 
communications; 1.6% oil and gas; 3.1% pharmaceuticals and life sci-
ences; 1.7% power and utilities; and 9.9% real estate and construction.
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were interested to learn whether employees who have never 
observed unethical behavior differed in their intention to 
whistleblow when they would observe unethical behavior 
in the future from those who have observed unethical behav-
ior in the past. There are also several reasons we posed the 
question in terms of observed violation of organizational 
standards of conduct rather than observed unethical behav-
ior: the former requires less explanation, is more concrete 
for respondents, less dependent on the respondent’s personal 
ethical norms, and is applicable to others in the same organi-
zation. The scale reliability was low, as indicated by Cron-
bach’s alpha of 0.57.
Frequency of Observed Unethical Behavior
For measuring the frequency of observed unethical behavior, 
we used Kaptein’s (2008a) scale. This scale is an improve-
ment on the only other existing scale for unethical behavior 
developed by Newstrom and Ruch (1975). Kaptein’s scale 
consists of 37 items, with a time frame of 12 months (i.e., 
“In the past 12 months, I have personally seen or have first-
hand knowledge of employees or managers…”) and uses a 
five-point frequency scale: 1 = never, 2 = rarely, 3 = some-
times, 4 = often, and 5 = almost always. We calculated a gen-
eral score for the frequency of observed unethical behavior 
by averaging the answers to all 37 items of each respondent. 
The scale reliability was high, as indicated by Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.99.
Management Support for Whistleblowing
We measured management support for whistleblowing by 
using five items, following the elements described in the 
above section Management Support for Whistleblowing. 
Similar to what we did for the variable intention to whistle-
blow, we asked what management would do rather than 
what management has done. The question posed was, “If I 
reported a violation of my organization’s standards of con-
duct to management, I believe….”, followed by the items 
“appropriate action would be taken,” “my report would be 
handled confidentially,” “I would be protected from retali-
ation,” “those involved would be disciplined fairly regard-
less of their position,” and “I would be satisfied with the 
outcome.” We used the Likert scale for each response item, 
from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree, with the 
sixth alternative response (6 = not applicable) treated as 
missing value in the analysis. Since these items were not 
taken from an existing validated scale, we conducted a 
principal component analysis. Based on the screen plot and 
eigenvalues, one factor was extracted. The initial eigenvalue 
of the first factor was 4.0 and 0.32 for the second factor. 
The first factor explained 80.84% of the variance. All factor 
loadings were higher than 0.88. The reliability of the scale 
was high with Cronbach’s alpha of 0.94. The mean of the 
variable was calculated by averaging the answers on the five 
items.
Control Variables
To take into account the possibility that the respondents’ 
employment and demographic characteristics might have 
influenced their responses, the same five control variables 
as in Kaptein’s (2011) study were entered in the analyses: 
the respondent’s gender (with two categories, 1 = male, 
2 = female); age (with eight categories, from 1 = 18–24 
to 8 = 55 and over); job tenure (with five categories, from 
1 = less than 1 year to 5 = 10 years or more); and hierarchi-
cal level (with five categories, from 1 = individual contribu-
tor (not supervising others) to 5 = Senior Executive/Officer/
Director); and size of the respondent’s organization (with 
5 categories from 1 = 200–999 employees to 5 = 10,000 
employees or more).
Analyses
We used hierarchical regression analysis to test our hypoth-
eses. All predictor variables were grand-mean centered. 
The interaction of the mean-centered frequency of observed 
unethical behavior and the mean-centered moderator of 
management support were calculated by multiplying them. 
To exclude interference between the dependent variables, 
the intention to externally whistleblow was included as con-
trol variable in the analyses with the intention to internally 
whistleblow as dependent variable, and vice-versa.
Results
Table 1 depicts the means, standard deviations, and intercor-
relations of all research variables. The bivariate correlations 
between the frequency of observed unethical behavior and 
the intended whistleblowing responses were all significant 
at p < 0.01: r = 0.09 for internal whistleblowing, r = 0.44 for 
external whistleblowing, and r = 0.37 for whistleblowing 
in general (internal and/or external). Correlations between 
management support and the intended whistleblowing 
responses were also significant and positive: r = 0.54 for 
internal whistleblowing, r = 0.08 for external whistleblow-
ing, and r = 0.33 for whistleblowing in general. The cor-
relation between the independent variable, frequency of 
observed unethical behavior, and the moderating variable, 
management support, was insignificant (r = − 0.02; ns), indi-
cating discriminant validity between these two variables.
To examine the distinctiveness of the variables, a con-
firmatory factor analyses (CFA) was conducted. The meas-
urement model consisted of three factors: frequency of 
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observed unethical behavior, intention to whistleblow, and 
management support for whistleblowing. The results indi-
cated that the three-factor model provided an acceptable fit 
of the data (CFI = 0.91). The three-factor model had a signif-
icantly better fit than the one-factor model (CFI = 0.53) and 
the two-factor model when whistleblowing was the separate 
factor (CFI = 0.54). The fit was slightly better than the two-
factor model when management support was the separate 
factor (CFI = 0.87) and when unethical behavior was the 
separate factor (CFI = 0.90). The three-factor model did not 
have a better fit because the item external whistleblowing did 
not load very well in the scale for the intention to whistle-
blow. This explains the low scale reliability of the intention 
to whistleblow. Removing the item external whistleblowing 
from this scale would lead to a slightly better fit of the three-
factor model (CFI = 0.93). However, removing this item was 
not an option because this item is crucial in studying the 
concept of whistleblowing.
Regarding Hypothesis 1, we expected the relationship 
between the intention to internally whistleblow and the fre-
quency of observed unethical behavior to be diminishingly 
Table 1  Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
Variables M S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Organization size 3.23 1.61
2. Age 5.2 2.13 0.07**
3. Gender 1.48 0.50 − 0.05* − 0.08**
4. Hierarchical level 1.95 1.21 − 0.11** − 0.08** − 0.17**
5. Job tenure 3.79 1.24 0.09** 0.38** − 0.07** 0.09**
6. Intention to internally whistleblow 3.67 0.75 0.02 − 0.05** − 0.05** 0.22** 0.01
7. Intention to externally whistleblow 2.61 1.23 − 0.08** − 0.22** − 0.11** 0.19** − 0.08** 0.27**
8. Intention to whistleblow 3.15 0.81 − 0.05** − 0.19** − 0.10** 0.25** − 0.05** 0.68** 0.89**
9. Frequency of observed unethical behavior 1.55 0.95 − 0.08** − 0.24** − 0.14** 0.28** − 0.08** 0.09** 0.44** 0.37**
10. Observed management support 3.65 0.94 0.03 − 0.08** − 0.03 0.17** − 0.07 0.57** 0.08** 0.33** − 0.02
Table 2  Hierarchical regression 
analysis results for intention to 
internally whistleblow
Standardized coefficients are reported
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
Variables Internal whistleblowing
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Organization size 0.07** 0.07** 0.06**
Age 0.02 0.01 0.02
Gender − 0.01 − 0.01 − 0.01
Hierarchical level 0.19** 0.20** 0.20**
Tenure − 0.02 − 0.03 − 0.03
External whistleblowing intention 0.24** 0.26** 0.25**
Frequency of observed unethical behavior − 0.07** − 1.35**
Frequency of observed unethical behavior squared 1.31**
R2 0.10 0.11 0.16
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.11 0.16
∆ R2 0.01 0.05
F 46.8** 41.4** 56.7**
Fig. 1  Relationship between frequency of observed unethical behav-
ior and intention to internally whistleblow
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negative. The results in Table 2 and Fig. 1 show this to be 
the case: the final model (Model 3) has a regression coef-
ficient with the frequency of observed unethical behavior of 
β = − 1.35 (p < 0.01) and a squared frequency of observed 
unethical behavior of β = 1.31 (p < 0.01). Entering the quad-
ric term increased the explained variance by 5.2%. There-
fore, Hypothesis 1 is supported.
Table 3 and Fig. 2 show the results concerning Hypoth-
esis 2. We expected the relationship between the frequency 
of observed unethical behavior and the intention to exter-
nally whistleblow to be positively linear. Model 3 shows that 
for external whistleblowing only the frequency of observed 
unethical behavior was significant with β = 0.34 (p < 0.01), 
whereas the squared frequency of observed unethical behav-
ior was not significant with β = 0.04. Entering the quadric 
term here did not increase the explained variance, show-
ing that the relationship is linear. Entering the independ-
ent variable frequency of observed unethical behavior after 
the control variables led to an increase of 12.5% in the 
explained variance. Therefore, the more frequently employ-
ees observed unethical behavior, the stronger the intention to 
externally blow the whistle became. Therefore, Hypothesis 
2 is supported.
Table 4 and Fig. 3 present the results for Hypothesis 3. 
We expected the relationship between the whistleblowing 
intention and the frequency of observed unethical behavior 
to be curvilinear. In Model 2, the frequency of observed 
unethical behavior is positively related to the intention 
to whistleblow (β = 0.31; p < 0.01). Model 3 shows that 
the quadric term of the frequency of observed unethical 
behavior was significant (β = 0.91; p < 0.01). As shown in 
Fig. 3, the relationship between the frequency of observed 
unethical behavior and the intention to whistleblow is indeed 
a U-curve. That is, the relationship between the frequency of 
observed unethical behavior and the intention to whistleblow 
shows a negative or downward trend at lower frequencies of 
observed unethical behavior and a positive or upward trend 
at higher frequencies of observed unethical behavior. There-
fore, Hypothesis 3 is supported.
Regarding Hypothesis 4a, we predicted that the relation-
ship between the frequency of observed unethical behavior 
and the internal whistleblowing intention would be moder-
ated by management support. Table 5 and Fig. 4 present 
the results. In all three models, the relationship between 
management support and internal whistleblowing is strong, 
positive, and significant. In Model 3, the relationship 
between the interaction term frequency of observed unethi-
cal behavior × management support and the intention to 
Table 3  Hierarchical regression 
analysis results for intention to 
externally whistleblow
Standardized coefficients are reported
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
External whistleblowing
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Organization size − 0.05** − 0.04* − 0.04*
Age − 0.22** − 0.14** − 0.14**
Gender − 0.10** − 0.06** − 0.06**
Hierarchical level 0.10** 0.01 0.01
Tenure − 0.01 0.00 0.00
Internal whistleblowing intention 0.23** 0.22** 0.21**
Frequency of observed unethical behavior 0.38** 0.34**
Frequency of observed unethical behavior squared 0.04
R2 0.15 0.27 0.27
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.27 0.27
∆ Adjusted R2 0.12 0.00
F 66.9** 123.7** 108.2**
Fig. 2  Relationship between frequency of observed unethical behav-
ior and intention to externally whistleblow
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internally whistleblow was negative (β = − 0.10; p < 0.01), 
while that between the interaction term and frequency of 
observed unethical behavior squared was positive (β = 0.14; 
p < 0.01). For internal whistleblowing, high management 
support dampened the negative effect of the frequency of 
observed unethical behavior on internal whistleblowing 
(shown in Fig. 1) and even created a positive effect when 
the frequency levels of observed unethical behavior was 
medium or higher (Fig. 4, right-hand side of upper line). 
However, when employees believed that management sup-
port was low, the intention to internally whistleblow was 
negatively related to the frequency of observed unethi-
cal behavior (Fig. 4, lower line sloping downwards to the 
right). This leads to a situation that when the frequency of 
observed unethical behavior is low, the difference between 
low and high management support is smaller than when the 
frequency of observed unethical behavior is high. To con-
clude, this supports Hypothesis 4a.
Regarding Hypothesis 4b, we expected the relationship 
between the frequency of observed unethical behavior and 
external whistleblowing to be also moderated by manage-
ment support for whistleblowing. Table 6 and Fig. 5 show 
the results. The relationship between management support 
and external whistleblowing intention was low, negative, 
and only significant in Models 4 and 5 (but not in the full 
Model 6). In Model 6, the interaction term with the fre-
quency of observed unethical behavior was significant and 
positive (β = 0.17; p < 0.01), while the interaction term with 
the squared frequency of observed unethical behavior was 
significant and negative (β = − 0.10; p < 0.01). This confirms 
Hypothesis 4b.
Regarding Hypothesis 4c, we expected the relationship 
between the frequency of observed unethical behavior and 
whistleblowing to be moderated by management support 
for whistleblowing. As shown in Table 7, management sup-
port was significantly and positively related to the intention 
to whistleblow in all three models. The interaction term of 
the frequency of observed unethical behavior with man-
agement support was also significant (β = 0.09 in Model 5, 
and β = 0.08 in Model 6, with p < 0.01), while the interac-
tion term with the squared frequency of observed unethi-
cal behavior was not significant. Instead of the U-curve in 
Model 3 without the moderator (shown in Fig. 3), Fig. 6 
shows that we now have a straight linear relationship. The 
line was steeper in the case of high than in low manage-
ment support. This indicates that employees who believe that 
management will handle well their whistleblowing reports 
are increasingly more inclined to blow the whistle, whether 
internally and/or externally, than employees who believe that 
their management will be less supportive of their whistle-
blowing reports. Therefore, this supports Hypothesis 4c.
Summary and Implications
This study examined the relationship between the fre-
quency of unethical behavior observed by employees in 
their organization and their intention to whistleblow. We 
found a curvilinear relationship (supporting Hypothesis 
3) that is a combination of a diminishing negative rela-
tionship between the frequency of observed unethical 
behavior and the intention to internally whistleblow (sup-
porting Hypothesis 1) and a linear positive relationship 
between the frequency of observed unethical behavior 
and the intention to externally whistleblow (supporting 
Hypothesis 2). We also found that the beliefs employees 
have about how supportive their management would be 
in dealing with their whistleblowing reports moderates 
Table 4  Hierarchical regression analysis results for intention to 
whistleblow
Standardized coefficients are reported
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
Whistleblowing
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Organization size 0.00 0.01 0.01
Age − 0.20** − 0.12** − 0.12**
Gender − 0.09** − 0.06** − 0.06**
Hierarchical level 0.22** 0.15** 0.15**
Tenure − 0.09 − 0.01 − 0.01
Frequency of observed 
unethical behavior
0.31** − 0.59**
Frequency of observed 
unethical behavior 
squared
0.91**
R2 0.11 0.19 0.22
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.19 0.21
∆ Adjusted R2 0.08 0.02
F 56.1** 91.4** 91.9**
Fig. 3  Relationship between frequency of observed unethical behav-
ior and intention to whistleblow
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the relationship between the frequency of employees’ 
perception of unethical behavior and their intention to 
whistleblow in general, i.e. internally and/or externally 
(supporting Hypotheses 4a, 4b, and 4c). Therefore, Miceli 
et al. (2008) claim that research findings about whistle-
blowing are often counterintuitive is not true for the find-
ings of our study.
The findings of this study are consistent with the expecta-
tions we developed based on the Focus Theory of Normative 
Conduct. Whether and how employees form the intention 
to blow the whistle when they observe unethical behavior 
depends not only on what the injunctive norms are but also 
on what the descriptive norms are. The norms refer to both 
the evaluation of whether the observed behavior is unethical 
(descriptive) and, if so, whether employees have the respon-
sibility to blow the whistle (injunctive). In this regard, this 
study presents a new area for the Focus Theory of Norma-
tive Conduct. This theory on how injunctive and descriptive 
norms influence people in complying with these norms can 
Table 5  Hierarchical regression 
analysis results for internal 
whistleblowing intention 
moderated by management 
support
Standardized coefficients are reported
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
Internal Whistleblowing
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Organization size 0.04* 0.04* 0.03
Age 0.05** 0.05** 0.05*
Gender 0.00 0.01 0.01
Hierarchical level 0.11** 0.11** 0.11**
Tenure − 0.01 − 0.01 − 0.01
External whistleblowing intention 0.23** 0.23** 0.23**
Frequency of observed unethical behavior − 0.21* − 0.23* − 0.16
Frequency of observed unethical behavior squared 0.21** 0.24* 0.14
Management support 0.50** 0.50** 0.45**
Frequency of observed unethical behavior × management support − 0.01 − 0.10**
Frequency of observed unethical behavior squared × management support 0.14**
R2 0.36 0.36 0.36
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.36 0.36
∆ Adjusted R2 0.20 0.00 0.00
F 144.1** 129.7** 119.2**
Fig. 4  Relationship between frequency of observed unethical behav-
ior and internal whistleblowing intention moderated by management 
support
Table 6  Hierarchical regression analysis results for external whistle-
blowing intention moderated by management support
Standardized coefficients are reported
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
External whistleblowing
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Organization size − 0.04* − 0.04 − 0.03
Age − 0.14** − 0.13** − 0.13**
Gender − 0.06** − 0.06** − 0.06**
Hierarchical level 0.02 0.02 0.02
Tenure 0.00 − 0.00 0.00
Internal whistleblowing intention 0.25** 0.25** 0.26**
Frequency of observed unethical 
behavior
0.19 0.42** 0.37**
Frequency of observed behavior 
squared
0.19 − 0.09 − 0.02
Management support − 0.09** − 0.08** − 0.05
Frequency of observed unethical 
behavior × management support
0.10** 0.17**
Frequency of observed unethical 
behavior squared × Management 
support
− 0.10*
R2 0.28 0.29 0.29
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.28 0.28
∆ Adjusted R2 0.00 0.01 0.00
F 98.59** 91.89** 84.09**
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also be used to examine how these norms influence people’s 
responses to others who do not comply with the norms.
Apart from results that support our hypotheses, the study 
also has other interesting secondary results. For instance, 
the intention to whistleblow internally is quite strong when 
the frequency of observed unethical behavior is low (as 
shown in Fig. 1); employees are more inclined towards 
internal instead of external whistleblowing but the difference 
becomes smaller when their frequency of observed unethical 
behavior increases (shown in Figs. 1 and 2); some employees 
had the intention to externally whistleblow even when the 
frequency of observed unethical behavior was low (shown in 
Fig. 2); some employees indicated that they had the intention 
to internally whistleblow even when management support 
was low (shown in Fig. 4); between high and low manage-
ment support for whistleblowing, there was a substantial 
difference in the strength of the intentions of employees to 
internally whistleblow (shown in Fig. 4); only when there 
was a low frequency of observed unethical behavior did the 
employees indicate that they were more inclined to blow 
the whistle externally when they believed that management 
support was low than when they believed it was high (shown 
in Fig. 5); and some control variables were only significant 
(i.e., hierarchical level) for internal whistleblowing, and 
some control variables were only significant (i.e., age and 
gender) for external whistleblowing, while the size of the 
organization was significant for both (as shown in Tables 2 
and 3).
Directions for Future Research
This study points to several possible research directions 
to build a richer model for a better understanding of the 
whistleblowing decision-making process.
One possible research is to examine whether the fre-
quency of different types of unethical behavior has dif-
ferent relationships with the intentions of employees to 
whistleblow. The current study examined general unethical 
behavior and used an aggregated score for the frequency of 
observed unethical behavior. While we found a significant 
relationship between the frequency of observed unethical 
behavior in general and the intention to whistleblow, the 
relationship may be different for different kinds of unethi-
cal behavior. For example, do the frequency of observed 
unethical behavior towards the organization, such as steal-
ing company assets, and the frequency of observed unethi-
cal behavior towards external stakeholders, such as engag-
ing in false or deceptive sales and marketing practices, 
have different relationships with the intention of employ-
ees to whistleblow? We may find that a higher frequency 
of observed unethical behavior towards the organization 
leads to stronger intentions to whistleblow internally 
because the interests of the organization are at stake, while 
Fig. 5  Relationship between frequency of observed unethical behav-
ior and external whistleblowing moderated by management support
Table 7  Hierarchical regression analysis results for intention to 
whistleblow moderated by management support
Standardized coefficients are reported
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
Whistleblowing
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Organization size − 0.01 − 0.00 − 0.00
Age − 0.10** − 0.09** − 0.09**
Gender − 0.05* − 0.04* − 0.04*
Hierarchical level 0.10** 0.10** 0.10**
Tenure − 0.00 − 0.01 − 0.01
Frequency of observed unethical 
behavior
0.01 0.20 0.21
Frequency of observed behavior 
squared
0.34** 0.10 0.09
Management support 0.26** 0.27** 0.27**
Frequency of observed unethical 
behavior × management support
0.09** 0.08*
Frequency of observed unethical 
behavior squared × management 
support
0.02
R2 0.27 0.28 0.28
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.27 0.27
∆ R2 0.06 0.00 0.00
F 108.18** 98.69** 88.79**
Fig. 6  Relationship between frequency of observed unethical behav-
ior and whistleblowing moderated by management support
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a higher frequency of unethical behavior towards external 
stakeholders leads to stronger intentions to whistleblow 
externally because the interest of those stakeholders are 
at stake.
Another interesting research direction concerns the rela-
tion between the frequency and moral intensity of unethi-
cal behavior. Jones’ (1991) six characteristics of the moral 
intensity of ethical dilemmas for understanding ethical 
decision-making have been applied to unethical behavior 
to understand whistleblowing decision-making. One of the 
contributions of our study is the introduction of frequency of 
(unethical) behavior as another relevant characteristic. Hav-
ing studied the frequency of unethical behavior as a separate 
characteristic does not imply that it is not related to or part 
of any of Jones’ six characteristics. In this article, we already 
argued that a higher frequency of observed unethical behav-
ior in an organization may make unethical behavior a more 
serious issue in that organization (this is the characteristic of 
the “magnitude of consequences”) and more accepted (this is 
the characteristic of the “social consensus”). In this regard, 
future research can examine whether the frequency of uneth-
ical behavior is indeed related to these two characteristics or 
perhaps to the other characteristics as well (i.e., probability 
of effect, temporal immediacy, proximity, and concentration 
of effect) of the moral intensity of unethical behavior. A 
related question is whether the frequency of unethical behav-
ior has also a direct influence on the intention to whistleblow 
or maybe only an indirect influence through Jones’s six char-
acteristics. Even if the results would show that the frequency 
of unethical behavior is not a separate characteristic but only 
part of the other six characteristics, the current study still 
makes this contribution: i.e., the concept of moral intensity 
should not be restricted to one single incident of unethical 
behavior, but it should be related to any and all unethical 
behavior observed by an employee.
Another possible research direction concerns the recipi-
ents of whistleblowing reports. Our study included four 
types of such recipients. It would be interesting to include 
more specific recipients of external whistleblowing reports, 
such as a regulator, professional associations, or the press, 
and other internal recipients, such as different layers of man-
agement and supporting functions as HR, Legal, and Secu-
rity. By including more recipients, the explanatory power 
of the model increases. In this respect, the response scale 
used in this study for the intention to whistleblow could also 
be enriched. Because we asked the respondents their inten-
tions to whistleblow to each type of recipient, we were not 
able to establish the sequence by which employees would 
approach the different recipients; this is important, for exam-
ple, to understand whether employees will first whistleblow 
internally before they do so externally. This sequential pro-
cess of reporting to different recipients is well examined 
by Vandekerckhove and Phillips (2019). When redoing the 
current research, respondents could also be asked about their 
intended sequence of whistleblowing recipients.
More moderating variables may also be included to 
explain the relationship between the frequency of observed 
unethical behavior and the intention to whistleblow. The 
current study found that management support for whistle-
blowing, operationalized as the belief of employees of how 
managers respond to reports of unethical behavior, had a sig-
nificant moderating effect. It could be investigated whether 
other factors, for instance preventive ones like a corporate 
ethics program, are relevant for how employees respond to 
the frequency of observed unethical behavior.
An interesting research direction pertains to the use of 
time-frames, other than the twelve months used in the cur-
rent study, for observed unethical behavior. Because unethi-
cal behavior is not observed very frequently—its mean in our 
study was 1.55 on a five-point scale for 37 items—extend-
ing the time frame to two or more years would increase the 
variance and provide more room to build rich models. A 
longer time frame could also take into account the expe-
rience employees have with whistleblowing better than a 
one-year time frame could. As the follow-up and comple-
tion of a whistleblowing report can take a long period (Van-
dekerckhove and Phillips 2019), employees will be able to 
evaluate their management’s support for whistleblowing 
better over a longer period than over a one-year period. Fur-
thermore, employees could use the period after completing 
their whistleblowing report to get an idea about manage-
ment support for whistleblowing: if after reporting, the fre-
quency of observed unethical behavior does not change or 
even increases, then this could undermine their belief in their 
management’s support for whistleblowing; if the reported 
unethical behavior does not happen again over a long period, 
this could improve their belief in their management’s sup-
port for whistleblowing.
Another research direction for building a richer model 
to help us understand better the whistleblowing decision-
making process is to examine the relationship between the 
frequency of observed unethical behavior and the intention 
of employees to whistleblow in the opposite direction than 
the one taken by the current study. The current study exam-
ined the influence of the frequency of observed unethical 
behavior on the intention of employees to whistleblow but 
not on the whistleblowing behavior itself. We have good rea-
sons for this, as discussed above in the section Whistleblow-
ing and Unethical Behavior. At the same time, we should not 
expect that intentions to whistleblow always translate into 
actual whistleblowing behavior (cf. Mesmer-Magnus and 
Viswesvaran 2005; Park and Blenkinsopp 2009). In cases 
when the intention to whistleblow leads to whistleblowing 
behavior, an interesting research question is whether whistle-
blowing behavior also leads to less unethical behavior. This 
relationship could be explained by the idea that successful 
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whistleblowing does not only lead to the termination of the 
reported unethical behavior but also to the confirmation or 
strengthening of the descriptive norm in the organization 
that unethical behavior is not allowed and even disapproved, 
which stimulates employees to not behave unethically. The 
same may be asked about the moderating variable in this 
study: whether management support for whistleblowing 
leads to less unethical behavior. This relationship could be 
explained by the idea that employees who consider behav-
ing unethically are deterred by their belief that their man-
agement will not accept unethical behavior and will take 
adequate actions towards the perpetrator when they find 
out about these unethical behaviors. Employees may also 
expect that their management is more likely to be informed 
about unethical behavior in the organization because oth-
ers in the organization who observe unethical behavior and 
believe that management will handle their whistleblowing 
reports well are more willing to report such behavior to 
management.
A final research direction to be mentioned here is the 
search for other theories that can enrich our understanding 
about the relationship between the frequency of unethical 
behavior and whistleblowing. This article used the Theory of 
Normative Conduct (Cialdini et al. 1991) to explain this rela-
tionship. Although this theory helped develop our hypothe-
ses, other theories may add explanatory power. One possible 
theory is the moral approbation theory developed by Jones 
and Verstegen Ryan (1997, 1998). Jones and Verstegen Ryan 
argue that moral approbation, the desire of moral agents to 
be seen as moral by themselves or others, plays a critical role 
in moral decision-making. This moral approbation has two 
facets. One is a desired level of moral approbation, which 
consists of, for example, a desire for moral approval from 
the agent’s referent group. Second is an anticipated level 
of moral approbation, which depends on the level of moral 
responsibility the agent anticipates will be attributed to him/
her by the agent’s referent group. A desired level of moral 
approbation could be used to explain why an increase in the 
frequency of observed unethical behavior leads to weaken-
ing of employees’ intention to blow the whistle internally. 
For instance, that the unethical behavior continues or is not 
corrected indicates that it is approbated. An anticipated level 
of moral approbation could be used to explain why employ-
ees are more intent to whistleblow externally when they 
observe unethical behavior more frequently. For instance, 
that the more frequently employees do not stop or correct 
the unethical behavior they observe, the more others out-
side the organization will see them as complicit, thus stimu-
lating their sense of responsibility to stop and correct the 
behavior by reporting it to people outside their organization. 
Another potentially useful theory is the Corporate Ethical 
Virtues Theory (Kaptein 2008b) because it can help under-
stand better how employees interpret unethical behavior in 
terms of the current ethical culture in their organization. The 
Neutralization Theory (Maruna and Copes 2005) or Moral 
Disengagement Theory (Bandura 1999) can explain how 
employees may increasingly rationalize or justify their inac-
tion when they observe unethical behavior more frequently.
Managerial Implications
This study showed that the more frequently employees 
observe unethical behavior, the less they have the intention 
to whistleblow internally and the more they have the inten-
tion to whistleblow externally. These findings provide fur-
ther reasons that strengthen the importance of management 
preventing unethical behavior (Paine 1994; Treviño and 
Weaver 2003). First, unethical behavior is not only undesir-
able in and of itself but it also has negative consequences. 
When employees’ intention to whistleblow internally 
becomes weaker or disappears due to a higher frequency 
of observed unethical behavior, it becomes less likely that 
employees will actually inform management when they 
witness unethical behavior. It then also becomes less likely 
that management will be able to stop and correct unethi-
cal behavior, whereas this becomes even more urgent with 
higher frequency of observed unethical behavior. Second, a 
higher frequency of observed unethical behavior also means 
that employees’ intention to whistleblow externally becomes 
stronger. Because unethical behavior would be reported not 
to management but to recipients outside of the organization, 
this would mean management losing control or charge of 
stopping and correcting unethical behavior. Quite possibly, 
as a result, external agencies would question and investigate 
management for its failure to adequately prevent and redress 
such unethical behavior.
This study also showed that employees’ beliefs about 
how management will handle their whistleblowing reports 
influence whether they will blow the whistle when they fre-
quently observe unethical behavior and whether they would 
do it internally or externally. Management support for 
whistleblowing was operationalized in terms of the expec-
tations of employees about the extent to which their manage-
ment would take appropriate action when it receives whistle-
blowing reports, would handle reports confidentially, protect 
whistleblowers from retaliation, discipline the perpetrator(s) 
fairly and consistently, and would ensure the usefulness and 
effectiveness of whistleblowing reports, say, by eliminat-
ing reported unethical behavior within a reasonable time 
frame. An important managerial implication of our study 
is that convincing employees that their management meets 
these expectations prevents the weakening of employees’ 
internal whistleblowing intention when they increasingly 
observe unethical behavior in their organization. This is 
the good news. The bad news is that this particular inten-
tion becomes weaker if employees are not convinced. So 
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hopefully managers will respond well to the findings of 
this study by responding appropriately to their employees’ 
reports about unethical behavior in organization.
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